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When Tool Names Are Not Identities: Measuring Provider Misbinding in MCP-Based AI Agents

信息来源:arXiv·

内容摘要

Large language model (LLM) applications increasingly act as agents that select and invoke external tools. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes this interaction by allowing clients to compose tools advertised by multiple servers. However, tool metadata used for discovery and selection is not, by itself, necessarily bound to a verified provider identity. This paper studies this gap as tool-provider misbinding: a failure in which a request intended for a legitimate provider is instead resolved to an attacker-controlled tool. The attacker does not compromise the host, LLM, legitimate server, or network channel; it only operates another MCP server that advertises tools with chosen metadata. We formulate tool provider misbinding as an attacker-controlled tool-selection optimization problem and evaluate it in a controlled MCP environment across five LLM-based clients. The results show that interactions drive misbinding. The strongest failures occur when exact-name collision, task-aligned description, and compatible schema reinforce one another, but authority-enhanced descriptions with compatible schema can also cause wrong-provider execution or unresolved provider ambiguity without name collision. Different models expose the same provider-binding weakness differently, including attacker-controlled provider selection, clarification requests, and unstable or inconsistent provider resolution.
内容分类AI 论文与研究
内容层级普通情报
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信息来源arXiv
站内情报编号intel-73ae6540a984cd96ed9cdcb1