A client's vibe-coded app was leaking data. Here's how I closed it in 24 hours

The Judge Reads Tokens: An Adversarial Evaluation of an Eval Toolkit's Own...

Building SYNKAI with Switch: a coding agent, an independent verification boundary, and a human...

I ship as an AI-augmented solo builder, but I never trust what the model produces. Here's the review discipline that caught a missing Android permission in every earlier release build.

The carryover problem Most prompt-injection work treats the attack as a one-turn event....

One branch has one step, the other has two, both feed combine. LangGraph.js runs combine twice. Why, and the two fixes: array edges and defer: true.

Automatic context compaction and human approval gates are on a collision course. A one-line entry in the OpenAI Agents SDK changelog names the bug, and the fix is an approval record that lives outside the conversation.

Six AI bot names in 14 days of logs on one site: 105 of 499 requests verified, 176 from outside the operator's IP list. How to check your own.

Prompt injection, hallucinated numbers, runaway costs and leaked card data: practical guardrails for putting AI agents into a security-sensitive platform.

Once you use a coding agent every day, the model itself stops being the main lever. What changes the...

Session files stored fourteen messages while the model saw six. A restart keeps your name, and seven turns later the same conversation forgets it.